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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes the influence of firms’ fair value system on earnings quality under IFRS. Korean firms are required 
to adopt IFRS in 2011. IFRS adoption was expected to increase value relevance of book value of equity and benefit 
information users’ decision making. However, prior Korean studies report that value relevance of book value of equity 
is indifferent between under K-GAAP and IFRS. We consider that the indifference in value relevance of book value of 
equity after IFRS adoption is due to different level of fair value system among firms. We investigate whether the 
different level of fair value system among firms lead to the difference in earnings quality. Furthermore, we examine 
how each firm’s fair value system affect earnings quality under IFRS.  
 
This study finds following results. First, firms with weak fair value system smooth income more frequently. Second, 
firms with weak fair value system experience small amount of positive profit and slight increase in net income compared 
to prior period more frequently. Third, firms with weak fair value system make less timely loss recognition. Lastly, book 
value of equity and goodwill has low relative value relevance for weak fair value systemic firms, while both book value 
of equity and goodwill have incremental value relevance for firms with strong fair value evaluation system.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
his paper examines whether fair value system under IFRS is associated with earnings quality, using 
Korean firm-year observations. Korean listed companies adopted IFRS in 2011 mandatorily. The IFRS 
adoption in Korea was expected to increase value relevance of book value of equity and benefit 
information users’ decision making (Choi & Rhee, 2015; Rhee, Yoo, & Cha, 2016). Despite the expectation, prior 
Korean studies report that value relevance of book value of equity is indifferent between under K-GAAP, accounting 
standards prior to IFRS adoption, and IFRS (Choi, Kim, & Choi, 2011; Choi, 2013). We expect the indifference in 
value relevance of book value of equity after IFRS adoption is due to different level of fair value system among firms. 
Before IFRS adoption, firms were unaccustomed to evaluating assets and liabilities in fair value. After adopting IFRS, 
the level of fair value system determines the effectiveness of accounting information, because each firm could practice 
fair value system differently. In other words, if a firm properly interprets and practices extended fair value evaluation 
due to IFRS adoption, information it provides would reflect firm’s economic substance, which will benefit information 
users to make reasonable decisions. However, if a firm chooses to practice IFRS fair value evaluation as a method of 
income smoothing or meet-or-beat target earning, information effectiveness would decrease under IFRS. 
 
In this study, we investigate whether the different level of fair value system among firms lead to the difference in 
earnings quality. Furthermore, we examine how each firm’s fair value system affect earnings quality under IFRS. We 
measure the level of fair value evaluation system by goodwill accounting method for following reasons. First, 
managers can behave opportunistic in calculating fair value of goodwill. Calculation of goodwill value involves 
subjective estimations, such as projected cash generating unit, which is open to possible manipulation. In addition, 
characteristic of goodwill account is that it is unlikely to be reversed in the future, which makes vulnerable for 
management manipulation. In fact, goodwill impairment loss is not recognized in timely manner and profit tends to 
be overstated due to managers’ opportunistic manipulation after IFRS adoption (Carlin & Finch, 2011; Wines, Dagwell, 
& Windsor, 2007). Second, it is mandatory to evaluate goodwill account in fair value. Unlike tangible assets, goodwill 
T 
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is recognized as an indefinite asset and impairment test should be performed every year, which eliminates sample 
selection bias. Third, goodwill accounting method changed dramatically from straight line amortization to impairment 
loss recognition after IFRS adoption. Due to such characteristics, we expect goodwill is a reasonable proxy for 
investigating the actual condition of fair value evaluation system after adopting IFRS. 
 
Using a sample of firm-year observations from 2011 to 2012, 93 out of 283 firm-year observations recognized value 
of goodwill in 2009 or 2010 using K-GAAP goodwill standard and did not recognize impairment loss afterwards. The 
fact that these firms maintains goodwill value from 2009 or 2010 based on K-GAAP, even though goodwill could be 
easily impaired by economic environment, indicates such firms fair value system is weak at the time of introduction 
and after adopting IFRS. We separate the sample depending on whether they recognized historical goodwill value 
using K-GAAP or whether they recognized impairment loss of goodwill after IFRS adoption. We consider the former 
group to have a weak fair value evaluation system and latter to have a stronger one, and compare earnings quality 
between two groups under IFRS. 
 
We follow Barth, Landsman, & Lang (2008) and measure income smoothing, earnings management to meet-and-beat 
target, immediate loss recognition, book value of equity and goodwill from relative value relevance perspective. 
Results are as follows. First, firms with weak fair value system smooth income more frequently. Firms with weak fair 
value system have lower variance of net income change and variance of net income change to variance of operating 
cash flow change, which are measures for income smoothing. The difference between firms with weak or strong fair 
value system was significant at 1% level. Results indicate poor quality of fair value system is correlated with income 
smoothing. It is also consistent with prior literatures that lower net income change volatility and cash flow change to 
net income change volatility are related to higher income smoothing (Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003; Lang, Raedy, & 
Wilson, 2006). Second, firms with weak fair value system experience small amount of positive profit and slight 
increase in net income compared to prior period more frequently. Based on the fact that profit close to zero or slight 
increase in net income are evidence of earnings management (DeGeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser, 1999; Burgstahler & 
Dichev, 1997), result suggests management from weak fair value system could manage earnings through fair value 
evaluation in order to meet-or-beat target earnings. Third, firms with weak fair value system make less timely loss 
recognition. Firms with high earnings quality tend to immediately recognize loss based on prior studies. Therefore, we 
interpret firms with poor fair value system would have lowered earnings quality after IFRS adoption by delaying loss 
recognition. Lastly, book value of equity and goodwill has low relative value relevance for weak fair value systemic 
firms, while both book value of equity and goodwill have incremental value relevance for firms with strong fair value 
evaluation system. Based on the prior literature that earnings quality is positively related with explanatory power for 
stock price (Barth, Beaver, Landsman, 2001), we expect firms with poor fair value evaluation system manage earnings 
more frequently, which will eventually decrease the explanatory power of financial information for stock price. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related studies and develop hypothesis. Section 
3 describes research methodologies and samples. Section 4 provides empirical evidence and Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
II. PRIOR LITERATURES AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Recent research investigates relative value relevance of financial information after IFRS adoption. However, result is 
mixed, especially for how change in cost of equity book value or net income due to IFRS adoption affect relative value 
relevance. Hung and Subramanyam (2007) find that relative value relevance of financial information improved after 
adopting IFRS, especially for book value of equity, using German sample. On the other hand, Capkun, Jeny-Cazavan, 
Jeanjean, & Weiss (2008) document that adjusted profit recognized by adopting IFRS has additional relative value 
relevance, while adjusted net income does not. 
 
Mixed result is consistent using Korean sample. Choi et al. (2011) provide evidence that amount of adjusted profit 
recognized during switching to IFRS has relative value relevance, but amount of adjusted equity book value does not 
have relative value relevance. Choi (2013) find amount of adjusted equity book value due to IFRS adoption is 
negatively correlated with stock price, and adjusted profit amount does not have statistically significant association 
with stock price. 
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There is much evidence on effect of IFRS adoption on book value of equity is indifferent from K-GAAP from relative 
value relevance perspective. We consider the fact effect of IFRS adoption on capital market could differ by firm 
characteristic (Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008; Christensen, Hail, & Leuz, 2013), and expect IFRS adoption effect 
on earning quality could be different depending on firm characteristics and each firm’s fair value evaluation system. If 
firms utilize IFRS fair value system as a method of income smoothing or meet-or-beat target earnings, firms’ equity 
book value relative value relevance would be lower compared to K-GAAP. On the same note, if firms use fair value 
system under IFRS in order to reflect firms’ economic substance, relative value relevance of equity book value would 
improve.  
 
We thus expect that earnings management for income smoothing or meet-or-beat target earnings would be different by 
firm’s fair value evaluation system, and whether such difference influence relative value relevance for stock price. We 
analyze the effect of firm’s fair value evaluation system on earnings quality under IFRS and set a hypothesis as follow. 
 
Hypothesis: There is a significant association between firm’s fair value system and earnings quality under IFRS. 
 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Measure of Firm’s Fair Value System 
 
In order to examine firm’s fair value system effect on earnings quality, we use goodwill accounting method as a proxy 
for fair value system. Our empirical analyses are based on 147 firms which recognized goodwill in 2011 or 2012. 49 
firms out of 147 recognized a same amount of goodwill as 2009 and 2010 based on K-GAAP, and did not recognized 
any impairment loss under IFRS. Based on prior studies that firms use goodwill to manage earnings (Carlin & Finch, 
2011; Wines et al. 2007), we expect firms which continued to use goodwill value under K-GAAP and not recognized 
impairment loss to be firms with weak fair value evaluation system (FVS=1). We consider firms that recognized 
impairment loss after adopting IFRS to be firms with strong fair value system (FVS=0), and compare earnings quality 
of two groups under IFRS. 
 
3.2. Measure for Earnings Management 
 
We follow Barth et al. (2008) in measuring earnings quality, and use following four factors. 
  
First, we use the variance of change in net income (ΔEARNV) to measure level of firms’ income smoothing. Firms with 
large variance in net income change smooth income less (Leuz et al. 2003; Lang et al 2006), therefore it is reasonable 
to assume firms with small net income change variance is related with high income smoothing. Considering net income 
change could be caused by outside factors, we use residual (ΔEARNV) from equation (1) to measure the net income 
change variance. We perform F-test to examine whether net income change variance is statistically significant 
depending on level of fair value system (FVS). 
 
Equation (1) 
 𝛥𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁 = 𝑎( + 𝑎*𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑎.𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑎2𝐶𝑆 + 𝑎4𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝑎7𝐿𝐼𝐴 + 𝑎8𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 + 𝑎;𝐶𝐹 + 𝑎=𝐵𝐼𝐺4 +𝑎@𝑀𝑅𝐾𝑇 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 (1) 
 
where, 
 
ΔEARN = change in net income; 
ΔEARNV = variance of change in net income, residual from equation (1); 
SIZE = natural log of total asset; 
GROW = sale growth; 
CS = percent change in common stock capital sourcing; 
LEV = leverage, measured by total liabilities divided by total assets; 
LIA = percent change in total leverage; 
TURN = total sale divided by total asset; 
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CF = operating cash flow divided by total asset; 
BIG4 = 1 if auditor is one of Big 4, 0 otherwise; 
MRKT = 1 if listed in KOSDAQ, 0 otherwise. 
 
Second, we measure the level of earnings management using the ratio of variance of the change in net income 
(ΔEARNV) to the variance of the change in cash flows (ΔCFV). Firms which managed earnings would have lower net 
income change variance to cash flow change variance, thus ΔEARN will have lower coefficient value than ΔCF. In 
order to eliminate outside influence on ΔEARNV and ΔCFV, we use residual from equation (1) and (2). 
 
Equation (2) 
 𝛥𝐶𝐹 = 𝑎( + 𝑎*𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑎.𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑎2𝐶𝑆 + 𝑎4𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝑎7𝐿𝐼𝐴 + 𝑎8𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 + 𝑎;𝐶𝐹 + 𝑎=𝐵𝐼𝐺4 +𝑎@𝑀𝑅𝐾𝑇 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 (2) 
 
where, 
 
ΔCF = change in operating cash flow; 
ΔCFV = variance of the change in operating cash flow, residual from equation (2). 
 
Third, we use the frequency of small positive net income to measure earnings management. Logit analysis is performed 
using equation (3). We use the ratio of current net income to market value of equity (SP) is between 0% and 1% as 
dependent variable and level of fair value system (FVS) as independent variable. Coefficient of FVS will be positive if 
firms with weak fair value system have higher frequency of slightly positive income. 
 
Equation (3) 
 𝑆𝑃 = 𝑎( + 𝑎*𝐹𝑉𝑆 + 𝑎.𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑎2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑎4𝐶𝑆 + 𝑎7𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝑎8𝐿𝐼𝐴 + 𝑎;𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 + 𝑎=𝐶𝐹 + 𝑎@𝐵𝐼𝐺4 +𝑎*(𝑀𝑅𝐾𝑇 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 (3) 
 
where, 
 
SP = 1 if market value of equity to current net income is more than 0% and less than 1%, 0 otherwise; 
FVS = 1 if firm has weak fair value system, 0 otherwise. 
 
Fourth, we use the frequency of small increase in net income to measure earnings management. We perform logit 
regression using equation (4). If a firm has a weak fair value system and has a higher frequency of small increase in 
net income, coefficient for FVS would have significantly positive value. 
 
Equation (4) 
 𝑆𝐼 = 𝑎( + 𝑎*𝐹𝑉𝑆 + 𝑎.𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑎2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑎4𝐶𝑆 + 𝑎7𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝑎8𝐿𝐼𝐴 + 𝑎;𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 + 𝑎=𝐶𝐹 + 𝑎@𝐵𝐼𝐺4 +𝑎*(𝑀𝑅𝐾𝑇 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 (4) 
 
where, 
 
SI = 1 if market value of equity to current net income increase compare to prior period is more than 0% and 
less than 1%, 0 otherwise. 
 
3.3 Measure for Immediate Loss Recognition 
 
High earnings quality is correlated with timely recognition of loss according to prior studies. This study considers 
higher frequency of recognizing large amount of loss would be related to higher earning quality. If firms’ current net 
loss is more than 10% of market value of asset, it has value of 1 and 0 otherwise. We expect coefficient of FVS to be 
negative, if firms with weak fair value system do not recognize timely loss frequently. 
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Equation (5) 
 𝐿𝑁𝐸𝐺 = 𝑎( + 𝑎*𝐹𝑉𝑆 + 𝑎.𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑎2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑎4𝐶𝑆 + 𝑎7𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝑎8𝐿𝐼𝐴 + 𝑎;𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 + 𝑎=𝐶𝐹 + 𝑎@𝐵𝐼𝐺4 +𝑎*(𝑀𝑅𝐾𝑇 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 (5) 
 
where, 
 
LNEG = 1 if current net loss is more than 10% of market value of asset, 0 otherwise. 
 
3.4. Measure for Relative Value Relevance 
 
High quality of earnings reflects firms’ economic substances more efficiently. In other words, it would also be have 
high relative value relevance with stock return and book value of equity. We follow fair value model from Ohlson 
(1995) and measure relative value relevance between stock price and financial information. Because reasonableness 
of the fair value evaluation would influence explanatory power of equity book value for stock price, we divide the 
sample by FVS and compare explanatory power of equity book value for stock price. We use the difference in 
coefficient of determination between equation (6) and (7), in order to measure relative value relevance of equity book 
value. If fair value system affects explanatory power of equity book value, we expect firms with weak fair value system 
to have insignificant explanatory of equity book value for stock price. 
 
Equation (6) 
 
MVE=ɑ0+ɑ1BVE+ɑ2EARN+ɑ3LOSS+YearDummy+ɛ (6) 
 
Equation (7) 
 
MVE=ɑ0+ɑ1EARN+ɑ2LOSS+YearDummy+ɛ (7) 
 
where, 
 
MVE = Market value at year end; 
BVE = Book value at year end; 
EARN = Net income; 
LOSS = 1 if firm experienced net loss, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
In order to measure relative value relevance of goodwill, we analyze equity book value after subtracting stock price 
and goodwill book value (BVE-GW), net income (EARN) and book value of goodwill (GW). Difference in adjusted 
coefficient of determinant between equation (8) and (9) is used to measure relative value relevance of goodwill. If fair 
value system were to influence explanatory power of goodwill for value, goodwill book value of firm with weak fair 
value evaluation system would have insignificant explanatory power for stock price. 
 
Equation (8) 
 𝑀𝑉𝐸 = 𝑎( + 𝑎*(𝐵𝑉𝐸 − 𝐺𝑊) + 𝑎.𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝑎4𝐺𝑊 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦+ 𝜀 (8) 
 
Equation (9) 
 𝑀𝑉𝐸 = 𝑎( + 𝑎*(𝐵𝑉𝐸 − 𝐺𝑊) + 𝑎.𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 (9) 
 
where, 
 
BVE-GW  = Book value of goodwill subtracted from book value of equity at year end; 
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GW = Book value of goodwill at year end. 
To minimize possible firm specific effect caused by panel data characteristic, we use firm cluster effect. 
 
3.5 Sample Selection 
 
We use firms listed in KOSPI or KOSDAQ, and recognized goodwill in 2011 or 2012. We exclude (1) financial 
institutions and insurance companies, (2) firms that pre-adopted IFRS, (3) firms lacking financial statement under IFRS 
after 2010, and (4) firms lacking the necessary data to calculate control variables. This process yields a final sample of 
283 firm-year observations from 147 samples. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. Firms with weak fair value system (FVS=1) 
have high frequency of small positive profit (SP) and small increase in net income to prior period (SI), and low 
frequency of recognizing large amount of loss (LNEG). We interpret the result that weak fair value systemic firms 
increase earning in order to meet target earning and do not recognize loss in timely manner.  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Independent Variables Weak Fair Value System (FVS=1) Strong Fair Value System (FVS=0) Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std. 
ΔEARN -0.007 -0.001 0.088 -0.002 -0.010 0.156 
ΔCF 0.011 0.004 0.079 -0.001 -0.003 0.109 
SP 0.097 0.000 0.297 0.032 0.000 0.175 
SI 0.129 0.000 0.337 0.047 0.000 0.213 
LNEG 0.065 0.000 0.247 0.242 0.000 0.429 
MVE 1.099 0.714 0.929 0.971 0.683 0.789 
BVE 0.601 0.559 0.184 0.564 0.579 0.221 
EARN 0.031 0.036 0.089 -0.013 0.019 0.122 
GW 0.049 0.020 0.086 0.045 0.014 0.091 
SIZE 25.763 25.420 1.461 25.522 25.255 1.577 
GROW 0.092 0.063 0.205 0.078 0.060 0.371 
CS 0.035 0.000 0.170 0.107 0.000 0.402 
LIA 0.198 0.091 0.434 0.120 0.033 0.553 
LEV 0.892 0.789 0.946 1.253 0.727 1.451 
TURN 0.886 0.752 0.544 0.925 0.790 0.623 
CF 0.062 0.066 0.076 0.037 0.031 0.091 
BIG4 0.688 1.000 0.466 0.563 1.000 0.497 
MRKT 0.527 1.000 0.502 0.584 1.000 0.494 
# of Obs. 93 190 
 
 
Table 2 shows the results of Pearson correlation. The results show that the firms’ fair value system (FVS) has 
significant association with frequency of small positive profit (SP) and small increase in net income (SI). It was also 
negatively related with frequency of recognizing large loss (LNEG) at 1% significance level. These relationships 
represent the possibility of firms with weak fair value system reporting small positive profit or small increased net 
income more frequently, while recognizing large amount of loss less frequently compared to firms with strong fair 
value system.  
 
Fair value system has positive and significant correlation with current net earnings and book value of goodwill, thus 
we expect firms with consistent goodwill value will experience higher net income and goodwill value. However, 
variables known to affect earnings management are not yet controlled. Therefore, to collect more accurate results, we 
perform multiple regression analysis in following section. 
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Table 2. Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 FVS ΔEARN ΔCF SP SI LNEG MVE BVE EARN 
ΔEARN -0.016 (0.787) 
        
ΔCF 0.054 (0.362) 
-0.104 
(0.079) 
       
SP 0.136 (0.021) 
0.011 
(0.844) 
-0.047 
(0.423) 
      
SI 0.146 (0.013) 
0.017 
(0.768) 
-0.028 
(0.628) 
0.053 
(0.371) 
     
LNEG -0.215 (0.000) 
-0.202 
(0.000) 
-0.068 
(0.250) 
-0.112 
(0.059) 
-0.134 
(0.023) 
    
MVE 0.071 (0.230) 
0.106 
(0.072) 
0.081 
(0.169) 
0.185 
(0.001) 
0.016 
(0.779) 
-0.234 
(0.000) 
   
BVE 0.082 (0.165) 
0.122 
(0.039) 
0.011 
(0.853) 
0.038 
(0.518) 
0.061 
(0.305) 
-0.330 
(0.000) 
0.473 
(0.000) 
  
EARN 0.182 (0.002) 
0.366 
(0.000) 
0.021 
(0.717) 
0.016 
(0.780) 
0.110 
(0.064) 
-0.726 
(0.000) 
0.211 
(0.000) 
0.300 
(0.000) 
 
GW 0.018 (0.761) 
0.164 
(0.005) 
-0.032 
(0.590) 
0.174 
(0.003) 
0.023 
(0.691) 
0.064 
(0.279) 
0.319 
(0.000) 
0.205 
(0.000) 
-0.157 
(0.008) 
Note: Parentheses indicate P-value. 
 
4.2. Multiple Regressions Analysis 
 
Table 3 presents the results of main regression model, the effect of level of fair value system under IFRS on earnings 
quality. Followings are noteworthy: First, firms with weak fair value system smooth earnings more compared to firms 
with strong fair value system. Coefficients for dispersions of net income variance (ΔEARNV) for weak fair value firms 
(FVS=1) and strong fair value firms (FVS=0) are 0.0087 and 0.0202 respectively. The difference between two firms 
is statistically significant at 1% level. Ratios for dispersions of net income variance change (ΔEARNV) to dispersion 
of operating cash flow change (ΔCFV) between firms with different level of fair value system are statistically 
significant at 1% level (coefficient = 1.5980 and 3.9073). These finds lend support our hypothesis that firms with 
weaker fair value system manage earnings more. 
 
 
Table 3. Earnings Management Metrics 
Earning Management Metric Weak Fair Value System (FVS=1) 
Strong Fair Value System 
(FVS=0) F-test (P-value) 
Variability of ΔEARNV 0.0087 0.0202 2.323 (0.00) 
Variability of ΔEARNV over ΔCFV 1.5980 3.9073 6.054 (0.00) 
 
 
Second, firms with poor quality fair value system experience higher frequency of small positive profit or slight 
increase in net income. Coefficient values of FVS are given in Table 4 (1.464 and 1.092). We also find weak fair value 
systemic firms recognize large amount of loss less frequently, supported by significant and negative coefficient value 
of LNEG. Because small positive profit or small increase in net income is sign of earnings management, results suggest 
managers from weak fair value system firms use fair value evaluation as a way of meeting target earnings.  
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Table 4. Management of Earnings Target 
Independent Variables SP SI LNEG Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Intercept -13.744*** -2.85 -9.98*** -2.41 12.661** 2.45 
FVS 1.464*** 2.70 1.092** 2.19 -1.168* -1.80 
SIZE 0.457** 2.49 0.307** 2.01 -0.615*** -3.05 
GROW -1.314 -0.96 1.552*** 2.64 -4.690*** -4.04 
CS -0.911 -1.01 -3.303** -2.15 -0.190 -0.40 
LEV -0.197 -0.33 0.207 0.64 -0.080 -0.21 
LIA -0.180 -0.56 -0.523* -1.73 1.073*** 3.76 
TURN -1.114 -1.35 -1.270** -2.11 -0.510 -1.35 
CF -4.720 -0.84 -7.209* -1.70 -3.506 -1.33 
BIG4 -0.825 -1.21 0.519 0.95 0.505 1.09 
MRKT 0.986 1.23 0.532 0.93 0.204 0.36 
Cluster effect Included Included Included 
Year Dummy Included Included Included 
# of Obs. 283 283 283 
Note: *, **, *** Denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, all two-tailed. 
 
 
Third, we find no correlation between equity book value and goodwill book value for firms with weak fair value 
system. Results of Vuong’s test (Vuong, 1989) are shown in Table 5. Panel A represents results for firms with weak 
fair value system, and explanatory power of equity book value is statistically insignificant (Vuong Z-statistics = 0.63, 
p-value = 0.52). On the other hand, firms with strong fair value system have significant explanatory power of equity 
book value, shown in Panel B (Voung Z-statistics = 4.31, p-value = 0.00).  
 
 
Table 5. Management of Earnings Test (Vuong’s test) 
Panel A. Weak fair value system (FVS=1) 
Independent Variables MVE (Eq. 6) MVE (Eq. 7) Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
intercept 0.201 0.63 0.510*** 2.79 
BVE 0.570 0.96 
  
EARN 9.994*** -11.79 10.762*** 3.57 
LOSS -11.797*** -3.21 -12.148*** -3.32 
Year Dummy Included Included 
Cluster effect Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.272 0.270 
BVE incremental (Vuong) 0.002 (Z=0.63) 
# of Obs. 93 
Note: *, **, *** Denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, all two-tailed. 
 
Panel B. Strong fair value system (FVS=0) 
Independent Variables MVE (Eq. 6) MVE (Eq. 7) Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
intercept -0.233 -1.54 0.741*** 7.04 
BVE 1.883*** 4.86 
  
EARN 2.824* 1.80 5.195*** 3.80 
LOSS -3.607** 2.15 -5.716*** -3.47 
Year Dummy Included Included 
Cluster effect Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.329 0.074 
BVE incremental (Vuong) 0.255 (Z=4.31***) 
# of Obs. 190 
Note: *, **, *** Denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, all two-tailed. 
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Table 6 reports the relative value relevance of goodwill book value, depending on the level of fair value system from 
Vuong’s test (Vuong, 1989). Coefficient value of goodwill book value (GW) from firms with weak fair value system 
is statically insignificant (Voung Z-statistic=1.13, p-value=0.25), shown in Panel A. However, results in Panel B 
goodwill book value has significant relative value relevance in case of firms with strong fair value system (Voung Z-
statistic=2.17, p-value=0.02). It is interesting to notice the coefficient of BVE-GW, goodwill book value subtracted 
from equity book value, does not have a significant coefficient value. The result lends support for the usage of goodwill 
as a proxy for fair value evaluation system. 
 
 
Table 6. Value Relevance of Goodwill (Vuong’s test) 
Panel A. Weak fair value system (FVS=1) 
Independent Variables MVE (Eq. 8) MVE (Eq. 9) Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
intercept 0.215 0.70 0.562 1.54 
BVE–GW 0.375 0.59 -0.103 -0.15 
EARN 10.268*** 3.64 10.901*** 3.46 
LOSS -11.291*** -3.41 -12.183*** -3.29 
GW 2.754 1.59   
Year Dummy Included Included 
Cluster effect Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.311 0.262 
GW incremental (Vuong) 0.049 (Z=1.13) 
# of Obs. 93 
Note: *, **, *** Denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, all two-tailed. 
 
Panel B. Strong fair value system (FVS=0) 
Independent Variables MVE (Eq. 8) MVE (Eq. 9) Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
intercept 4.137 3.95 0.154 0.76 
BVE–GW 1.490*** 4.55 1.265*** 3.18 
EARN 3.734*** 2.69 3.373** 2.21 
LOSS -4.177*** -2.81 -4.225** -2.54 
GW 4.137*** 3.95    
Year Dummy Included Included 
Cluster effect Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.394 0.176 
GW incremental (Vuong) 0.198** (Z=2.17**) 
# of Obs. 190 
Note: *, **, *** Denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, all two-tailed. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we examine how fair value evaluation system under IFRS influence earnings quality using Korean data 
sample. We use goodwill evaluation as a proxy for the level of fair value system and compare earnings quality of firms 
with consistent goodwill value and firms with decreased goodwill after IFRS adoption.  
 
The findings of this study indicate firms with poor quality fair value system have higher frequency of income 
smoothing and earnings management in order to reach target earnings, compared to firms with strong fair value system. 
Weak fair value system firms also recognize large amount of loss less frequently, thus decreases the relative value 
relevance of equity book value. Results suggest expanded fair value system under IFRS could be used as a method of 
earnings management, which will lessen the explanatory power of financial information for stock price in return.  
 
Contributions of the paper are as follows. Our study provides useful insight to the effect of fair value system under 
IFRS on earnings quality. Results illustrate that the efficiency of financial information disclosed by firms could variate, 
depending on the level of fair value after IFRS adoption. We also use various variables used as a proxy for earnings 
management, which increases the creditability of our results.  
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Like many other studies, this study has a limitation. The sample of our study is limited to the firms that recognize 
goodwill, because we use goodwill to measure firms’ fair value system. Despite the limitation, we consider goodwill 
accounting method under IFRS to be a reasonable proxy for opportunistic earnings management. Furthermore, the 
study shed light on importance of fair value evaluation. Considering the recent adoption of IFRS, results of this paper 
would be useful for information users and regulators.  
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